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1.	From	rational	choice	to	bounded	rationality			Standard	rational	choice	theory	(RCT)	assumes	that	the	decision	maker	has	well-behaved	preferences	over	a	set	of	alternatives,	and	that	he	chooses	the	most	preferred	alternative.	By	“well-behaved”,	it	is	meant	that	preferences	satisfy	certain	properties	such	as	completeness	or	transitivity.	The	decision	maker’s	well-behaved	preferences	can	be	represented	by	a	utility	function,	and	his	choices	can	be	interpreted	as	the	result	of	utility	maximization.	The	alternatives	over	which	preferences	are	defined	may	be	either	risk-free,	in	which	case	RCT	is	typically	associated	with	ordinal	utility	theory,	or	risky,	in	which	case	RCT	is	associated	with	expected	utility	theory.	For	risk-free	contexts,	RCT	shows	that	choices	resulting	from	well-behaved	preferences	display	certain	consistency	features	that	are	characterized	by	the	axioms	of	revealed	preference	theory,	such	as	the	Weak	or	the	Strong	Axiom	of	Revealed	Preference	(WARP	and	SARP,	respectively).	In	turn,	choices	satisfying	these	axioms	can	be	interpreted	as	resulting	from	the	maximization	of	well-behaved	preferences	(for	an	overview	see	Mas-Colell,	Whinston	and	Green	1995,	chaps.	1-3,	6,	and	Ross,	this	issue).	RCT	is	widely	considered	to	have	produced	“an	elegant,	parsimonious,	imposing,	imperial	structure”	(Harstad	and	Selten	2013,	497),	and	its	defenders	point	both	to	its	alleged	predictive	success	and	its	normative	validity.	Moreover,	RCT	has	provided	the	framework	for	traditional	welfare	analysis:	if	rational	decision	makers	always	choose	what	is	best	for	them,	the	planner	should	select	the	alternative	they	would	choose	and	implement	their	decisions.	However,	in	the	last	thirty	years	or	so,	economists	and	psychologists	have	accumulated	persuasive	empirical	evidence	that	challenges	RCT	as	a	descriptively	adequate	theory	of	human	decision-making.		Generally	speaking,	any	theory	of	decision-making	that	deviates	from	the	RCT	paradigm	can	be	labelled	as	a	theory	of	boundedly-rational	decision	(for	an	overview,	Grüne-Yanoff	2007).	Since	there	are	various	ways	of	deviating	from	RCT,	there	are	also	different	theories	of	bounded	rationality	(BR).	For	instance,	we	may	drop	the	assumption	that	preferences	are	well	behaved	and	construct	a	theory	of	decision	with	
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incomplete	preferences.	Or	we	may	assume	that	preferences	and	utility	are	not	defined	only	over	sets	of	alternatives	but	also	depend	on	other	elements,	such	as	the	decision	maker’s	endowment	or	the	way	the	alternatives	are	presented	to	him.	Alternatively,	we	may	argue	that	the	decision	maker	does	not	choose	his	most	preferred	alternative	but,	for	example,	an	alternative	that	is	sufficiently	satisficing	according	to	his	preferences.	An	instance	of	the	latter	strategy	is	the	one	adopted	by	Herbert	Simon	in	his	1955	article,	which	can	be	considered	as	seminal	for	all	the	subsequent	BR	literature	(Simon	1955).	After	Simon,	and	especially	in	recent	years,	different	BR	theories	of	choice	have	been	formulated.	Although	none	of	them	has	yet	displaced	RCT	as	the	canonical	theory	taught	in	undergraduate	and	graduate	economics	courses,	their	popularity	is	on	the	rise	(for	a	discussion	of	why	RCT	is	still	canonical,	see	e.g.	Hands	and	Ross,	this	issue).	In	the	following,	we	will	discuss	methodological	aspects	of	three	approaches	to	BR.	The	first	one	is	often	associated	with	the	field	of	behavioural	economics	and	the	research	of	individuals	such	as	Amos	Tversky,	Daniel	Kahneman,	Richard	Thaler,	Colin	Camerer,	George	Loewenstein,	and	Matthew	Rabin.	In	this	approach,	choices	are	still	modelled	as	the	result	of	utility	maximization,	but	the	utility	function	that	is	maximized	is	not	the	standard	RCT	utility	function	because,	for	instance,	the	utility	of	a	given	alternative	depends	on	the	utility	of	another	alternative	taken	as	a	reference	point.	This	approach	to	BR	is	also	called	the	“heuristics-and-biases”	(H&B)	program	because	differences	between	the	standard	RCT	utility	function	and	the	actually	maximized	utility	function	are	imputed	to	the	fact	that	individuals	make	decisions	using	simple	decision	rules,	i.e.,	heuristics,	which,	however,	often	generate	biased	decisions.1	The	second	approach	to	BR	is	often	labelled	as	the	“fast-and-frugal-heuristics”	(FFH)	program	and	is	associated	with	the	research	of	Gerd	Gigerenzer	and	his	associates,	who	include	Reinhard	Selten,	Peter	Todd,	Daniel	Goldstein,	Ralph	Hertwig,	Konstantinos	Katsikopoulos	and	Nathan	Berg.	2	In	this	program,	utility	maximization	disappears	and	decisions	are	modelled	as	the	result	of	simple	and	easily	applicable	heuristics.	For	instance,	in	the	“Take-The-Best”	heuristic	(Gigerenzer	and	Goldstein	1996),	the	individual	has	an	ordered	vector	of	dimensions	or	“cues”	that	he	uses	in	a	lexicographic	way	to	discriminate	between	alternatives.	If	alternative	A	is	superior	to	alternative	B	with	respect	to	the	best	cue,	A	is	chosen.	If	the	best	cue	cannot	discriminate	between	A	and	B,	the	two	alternatives	are	compared	using	the	second-best	cue,	and	the	alternative	which	is	superior	with	respect	to	it	is	chosen.	If	the	second-best	cue	cannot	discriminate	between	A	and	B,	the	alternatives	are	compared	using	the	third-best	cue	and	so	on	until	a	discriminating	cue	is	found	and	a	choice	is	made.	These	heuristics	have	a	local	nature,	that	is,	they	change	when	the	decision	environment	changes,	but	in	their	“native”	environment	they	lead	to	efficient	rather	than	biased	choices.3	The	third	and	most	recent	approach	to	BR	we	consider	here	still	lacks	a	generally	accepted	label.	Paola	Manzini	and	Marco	Mariotti,	two	of	its	main	exponents,	call	it	the	
                                               1	Some	of	the	main	contributions	within	the	behavioral	economics	approach	to	BR	are	collected	in	Kahneman	and	Tversky	(2000),	Camerer,	Loewenstein	and	Rabin	(2004),	and	Lowenstein	(2007).	2	An	alternative	label	for	the	FFH	program	is	the	“simple	heuristics”	program.	However,	in	this	introduction	we	follow	the	terminology	adopted	by	some	of	the	contributors	to	the	present	issue	and	thus	use	the	FFH	label.	3	Some	significant	contributions	to	the	fast-and-frugal-heuristics	program	are	collected	in	Gigerenzer,	Todd,	and	the	ABC	Research	Group	(1999),	Gigerenzer	and	Selten	(2001),	Gigerenzer,	Hertwig	and	Pachur	(2011),	Todd,	Gigerenzer,	and	the	ABC	Research	Group	(2012).	
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“model-based	approach”	to	BR	(Manzini	and	Mariotti,	this	issue).	We	take	the	liberty	to	call	it	the	“heuristics-and-revealed-preference”	(HRP)	program,	as	this	name	seems	to	better	highlight	the	program’s	main	features.	As	in	the	first	two	approaches	to	BR,	decisions	are	conceived	as	determined	by	some	heuristic.	What	is	peculiar	to	the	heuristics-and-revealed-preference	program,	however,	is	that	the	choices	generated	by	a	given	heuristic	are	characterized	in	terms	of	axioms	of	revealed	preference.	The	characterizing	axiom	is	less	restrictive	than	the	Weak	or	Strong	Axioms	associated	with	rational	choices	but	still	rules	out	a	significant	array	of	choice	patterns.	For	instance,	in	the	“Categorize	Then	Choose”	model,	Manzini	and	Mariotti	(2012)	conceive	decisions	as	the	result	of	a	two-stage	process.	In	the	first	stage,	the	decision	maker	categorizes	the	alternatives	in	broad	classes	and	focuses	on	one	class;	in	the	second	stage	he	chooses	an	alternative	from	that	class.	For	example,	the	decision	maker	first	categorizes	restaurants	by	type	of	cuisine	and	focuses	on,	say,	Mexican	restaurants;	then	he	chooses	the	preferred	Mexican	restaurant.	Manzini	and	Mariotti	show	that	if	an	agent	makes	decisions	according	to	a	Categorize-Then-Choose	heuristic,	then	his	choices	will	display	a	specific	consistency	feature	that	can	be	characterized	in	terms	of	a	revealed	preference	axiom	they	call	Weak	WARP.	The	HRP	program	offers	a	straightforward	way	to	test	experimentally	the	validity	of	a	BR	model:	if	the	choices	recorded	in	the	experiment	violate	the	consistency	features	characterizing	the	model	of	BR	under	test,	than	the	model	is	“falsified”.	In	our	example,	if	the	decision	maker’s	choices	violate	the	Weak	WARP,	this	suggests	that	he	does	not	decide	according	to	the	Categorize-Then-Choose	heuristic.4	Advocates	of	the	three	BR	programs	just	discussed	have	sometimes	been	critical	of	the	other	approaches.	The	oldest	and	probably	most	known	dispute	in	the	field	is	the	one	between	Gigerenzer	(1991,	1996)	and	other	supporters	of	the	FFH	program	on	the	one	side,	and	Kahneman	and	Tversky	(1996)	and	other	advocates	of	H&B	on	the	other	side.	At	the	descriptive	level,	Gigerenzer	has	argued	that	the	heurists	described	by	Kahneman	and	Tversky	are	too	vague	to	have	actual	explanatory	power. At	the	normative	level,	Gigerenzer	has	criticized	the	heuristic-and-biases	program	for	sticking	to	RCT	as	a	normative	model	of	rationality	(see	the	articles	by	Berg,	Katsikopoulos	and	Hands	in	this	issue,	Jullien	and	Vallois	2014,	and	Vranas	2000).	Berg,	also	an	exponent	of	the	fast-and-frugal-heuristics	program,	criticizes	Manzini	and	Mariotti’s	program	for	focusing	on	the	internal	consistency	of	the	decision	maker’s	choices,	as	expressed	by	some	axiom	of	revealed	preference,	as	the	unique	criterion	to	assess	and	characterize	his	bounded	rationality	(Berg,	this	issue).	In	turn,	exponents	of	the	HRP	program	criticize	the	decision	models	put	forward	in	the	other	two	approaches	because,	they	argue,	their	models	lack	precise	implications	in	terms	of	choice	data	and	therefore	cannot	be	falsified	in	laboratory	experiments	(see	Manzini	and	Mariotti	2007,	and	Spiegler	2008).	
                                               4	Some	important	contributions	to	the	heuristics-and-revealed-preference	research	program	are	Kalai,	Rubinstein	and	Spiegler	(2002),	Rubinstein	and	Salant	(2006,	2012),	Manzini	and	Mariotti	(2007,	2012	and	2014),	Mandler,	Manzini	and	Mariotti	(2012),	Masatlioglu,	Nakajima,	and	Ozbay	(2012),	Cherepanov,	Feddersen	and	Sandroni	(2013).	Important	predecessors	of	this	approach	can	be	found	in	Luce	(1956,	1978).	Within	FFH,	some	authors	have	also	proposed	axiomatizations,	albeit	in	terms	of	preferences,	nor	revealed	choices	(e.g.	Drechsler,	Katsikopoulos	and	Gigerenzer	2014).	
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2.	Overview	of	the	contributions		The	five	contributions	collected	in	this	special	issue	discuss	important	methodological	aspects	of	these	recent	theories	of	BR.	Practitioners,	historians	and	methodologists	of	economics	reflect	on	the	most	recent	developments	in	the	theory	of	bounded	rationality.	Since	the	literature	on	behavioural	economics	and	the	H&B	program	is	already	copious,	we	asked	our	contributors	to	pay	special	attention	to	the	other	two	approaches	to	BR	mentioned	above,	namely	the	FFH	and	the	HRP	programs.	We	were	especially	interested	in	unravelling	similarities	and	differences	with	respect	to	their	modelling	choices	and	the	role	they	assign	to	evidence	of	different	kinds,	and	with	respect	to	their	stance	on	the	normativity	of	rationality	assumptions.	In	their	article,	Manzini	and	Mariotti	explain	how	the	HRP	program	can	be	applied	to	welfare	analysis.	BR	is	problematic	for	welfare	analysis	because,	if	the	agent’s	choices	are	generated	by	some	boundedly	rational	procedure,	it	is	no	longer	obvious	that	these	choices	should	be	used	as	a	basis	for	welfare	policies.	In	contrast	to	the	BR	approach	to	welfare	economics	put	forward	by	Douglas	Bernheim	and	Antonio	Rangel	(Bernheim	2009,	Bernheim	and	Rangel	2009),	Manzini	and	Mariotti	argue	in	favour	of	modelling	explicitly	the	boundedly-rational	cognitive	processes	(such	as	the	Categorize-then-Choose	heuristic	mentioned	above)	that	may	have	generated	the	choice	data.	In	particular,	Manzini	and	Mariotti	claim	that,	though	decision	making	models	should	always	give	priority	to	choice	data	and	be	characterized	in	terms	of	some	revealed	preference	axiom,	also	non-choice	data	can	be	used	to	construct	an	appropriate	model	of	decision	making	and	discriminate	between	different	plausible	models.	Among	non-choice	data,	Manzini	and	Mariotti	mention	physiological	and	neurophysiological	data	recorded	during	choice	tasks,	or	survey	responses	and	verbal	evidence	on	internal	states	related	to	choice	tasks.	Then	Manzini	and	Mariotti	call	attention	to	three	main	problems	associated	with	the	HRP	program:	(i)	two	or	more	different	BR	models	of	decision-making	may	be	undistinguishable	in	terms	of	choice	data	alone;	(ii)	even	if	only	one	BR	decision	model	is	compatible	with	choice	data,	the	model’s	primitives	may	have	multiple	interpretations;	(iii)	even	if	there	is	only	one	BR	decision	model	compatible	with	choice	data	and	only	one	accepted	interpretation	of	its	primitives,	these	primitives	may	be	specified	in	multiple	ways.	In	the	final	part	of	their	paper,	Manzini	and	Mariotti	discuss	how	these	problems	can	be	mitigated.	Both	Konstantinos	Katsikopoulos	and	Nathan	Berg	have	contributed	to	the	FFH	research	program,	and	in	their	contributions	to	this	issue	they	discuss	the	methodological	features	of	this	program	in	comparison	to	those	of	the	other	two	approaches	to	BR.	In	particular,	Katsikopoulos	argues	that	there	exist	two	distinct	cultures	of	research	on	BR,	the	“idealistic	culture”,	which	can	be	broadly	associated	with	the	H&B	program,	and	the	“pragmatic	culture”,	which	characterizes	the	FFH	program.	Katsikopoulos	does	not	discuss	explicitly	the	HRP	program,	although	many	of	its	features	seem	to	be	more	consonant	with	the	idealistic	rather	than	the	pragmatic	spirit.	For	Katsikopoulos,	the	two	cultures	differ	with	respect	to	both	their	underlying	assumptions	and	their	methodologies.	The	idealistic	culture	builds	its	models	from	criteria	of	internal	consistency	and	models	choice	as	the	result	of	optimization,	even	though	it	does	not	assume	the	optimization	process	to	be	real	but	only	“as-if”.	The	pragmatic	culture,	in	contrast,	builds	its	models	from	simple	rules	that	purportedly	
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describe	actual	mental	processes	and	models	choice	as	an	actual	satisficing	process.	Furthermore,	while	the	“idealists”	build	models	with	multiple	free	parameters,	mainly	seeking	to	explain	past	choices,	the	“pragmatists”	build	models	with	few	if	any	free	parameters,	with	the	aim	of	making	out-of-sample	predictions.	Finally,	the	two	cultures	also	offer	different	“stories”.	The	idealistic	culture	purports	that	people	systematically	behave	irrationally	and	that,	consequently,	they	should	do	better.	The	pragmatic	culture,	in	contrast,	maintains	that	people	do	well	if	they	learn	to	use	the	right	tool	in	the	right	situation.	Neither	of	these	two	“stories”	can	be	tested	empirically.	Rather,	each	constitutes	a	general	perspective,	an	underlying	model,	a	Weltanschauung.	Instead	of	empirical	tests,	a	critical	evaluation	should	therefore	focus	on	other	aspects,	for	example	the	psychological	reactions	of	the	public.	Simply	put,	according	to	Katsikopolous,	the	public	reacts	to	the	idealistic	culture	with	frustration,	delegating	choice	to	supposed	experts.	In	contrast,	the	public	reacts	to	the	pragmatic	culture	with	a	feeling	of	empowerment.	Berg	puts	forward	a	methodological	taxonomy	between	different	normative	approaches	to	BR	and	distinguishes	between	the	“ecological-rationality	approach”,	which	can	be	identified	with	the	FFH	program,	and	the	“consistency	approach”,	which	characterizes	RCT	in	the	first	place	but	has	been	imported	into	both	the	H&B	and	the	HRP	programs.	In	particular,	for	Berg	the	consistency	approach	explicitly	adopts	a	single	normative	criterion	to	evaluate	a	decision	procedure,	namely	its	internal	consistency	as	characterized	by	some	set	of	axioms	on	preferences	(such	as	transitivity)	or	choices	(such	as	the	WARP).	In	this	tradition,	what	distinguishes	a	rational	from	a	boundedly	rational	decision	is	that	the	internal	consistency	conditions	characterizing	rational	choice	are	more	stringent	than	those	characterizing	BR.	However,	Berg	argues,	there	is	no	empirical	evidence	that	would	confirm	a	close	connection	between	the	capacity	of	a	decision	procedure	to	generate	wellbeing	and	its	internal	consistency.	Moreover,	the	consistency	approach	implicitly	relies	also	on	normative	criteria	that	go	beyond	the	procedure’s	internal	consistency,	such	as	money-pump	arguments,	and	this	creates	a	tacit	methodological	tension	within	it.	In	contrast	to	the	consistency	school,	the	ecological-rationality	approach	makes	explicit	use	of	a	plurality	of	normative	criteria	to	evaluate	a	decision	procedure.	These	criteria	focus	on	the	procedure’s	performance	in	terms	of	wellbeing,	as	measured,	for	instance,	by	the	average	or	cumulative	payoffs	it	generates	in	the	specific	context	in	which	the	procedure	is	used.	These	criteria	are	external	to	the	procedure	itself	and	have	a	context-dependent	nature.	Therefore,	they	contrast	with	the	consistency	criterion,	which	is	internal	to	the	procedure	itself	and	aims	at	abstract	and	de-contextualized	validity.	In	the	last	section	of	his	paper,	Berg	discusses	Manzini	and	Mariotti’s	HRP	program	as	an	instance	of	the	consistency	approach	to	BR.	In	his	article,	Wade	Hands	compare	the	normative	theories	of	rationality	associated	with	RCT	and	the	FFH	program.	He	first	identifies	four	main	naturalistic	arguments,	that	is,	arguments	based	on	purported	empirical	evidence,	which	have	been	used	to	defend	the	normative	validity	of	RCT:	(i)	the	purported	willingness	of	people	and	possibly	experts	to	adjust	their	actual	choices	in	the	light	of	RCT;	(ii)	the	purported	willingness	of	people	(or	experts)	to	adjust	their	hypothetical	choices	in	the	light	of	RCT,	(iii)	the	purported	material	disadvantages	that	arise	from	violating	RCT	(e.g.	money	pump,	Dutch	books),	and	(iv)	the	purported	ability	of	people	to	comply	with	the	requirements	of	RCT.	Then	he	discusses	whether	these	arguments	support	the	superiority	of	the	FFH	
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program	over	RCT	as	a	normative	theory	of	decision-making.	Hands	makes	two	general	points	about	the	relationship	between	RCT	and	the	FFH	program:	first,	both	approaches	share	the	same	instrumental	view	of	rationality	and	second,	the	defence	of	FFH	in	terms	of	generic	evolutionary	stories	is	fragile	since	similar	evolutionary	stories	can	be	employed	to	defend	RCT.	Hands	argues	that	there	is	little	evidence	showing	either	actual	or	hypothetical	adoption	of	fast-and-frugal	heuristics	over	RCT	rules,	and	hence	neither	(i)	nor	(ii)	support	the	normative	validity	of	the	FFH	program	over	RCT.	Unlike	Berg	(this	issue),	Hands	claims	that	not	even	(iii)	is	supported,	as	little	evidence	exists	for	sustained	advantages	in	terms	of	wellbeing	deriving	from	the	adaptation	of	fast-and-frugal	heuristics.	Only	with	respect	to	(iv)	the	FFH	program	seems	to	do	better	than	RCT,	but	Hands	claims	that	that	the	empirical	evidence	on	this	point	is	still	weak.	Thus,	Hands	concludes	that,	at	least	from	the	viewpoint	of	the	four	naturalistic	arguments	considered,	the	advantages	of	the	fast-and-frugal-heuristics	program	over	RCT	as	a	normative	theory	of	rational	decision	making	seem	rather	weak.	If	Hands’	article	may	be	seen	as	a	temperate	defence	of	RCT,	in	the	last	article	of	this	special	issue	Don	Ross	offers	a	bold	epistemological	justification	for	the	persisting	dominance	of	RCT	in	economics.	Ross	opens	his	piece	by	acknowledging	that	“people	are	
obviously	not	boundedlessly	rational	agents,	since	nothing	is	or	could	be	such	an	agent”,	and	then	asks	“why,	if	economics	is	an	empirical	science,	do	economists	introduce	bounds	on	the	rationality	of	agents	in	their	models	only	cautiously	and	partially?”	To	answer	this	question,	Ross	constructs	an	elaborated	argument	whose	main	building	blocks	might	be	summarized	as	follows:	(i)	unlike	psychology,	economic	theory	is	primarily	about	aggregate	markets	phenomena	rather	than	individual	decisions;	(ii)	the	economic	theory	of	markets	is	not	significantly	modified	if	individual	decisions	are	modelled	using	some	BR	theory	rather	than	RCT;	(iii)	BR	individual	decision	processes	are	very	much	influenced	by	institutional	and	informational	properties	specific	to	the	market	in	question,	and	these	properties	change	from	market	to	market;	(iv)	there	is	not	and	there	cannot	be	a	general	model	explaining	how	BR	decision	processes	depend	on	the	institutional	and	informational	properties	of	market	structures.	Assuming	that	Ross’	four	claims	are	correct	(though	arguably	a	number	of	BR	theorists	and	economic	methodologists	would	not	agree	with	many	of	them),	the	fact	that	mainstream	economists	still	stick	to	RCT	appears	epistemologically	justified.	The	perspective	adopted	by	Ross	allows	him	not	only	to	rationalize	the	current	state	of	mainstream	economics,	but	also	to	predict	that	“no	general	model	of	bounded	rationality	should	ever	be	expected	to	feature	in	the	economist’s	toolkit,	regardless	of	the	extent	to	which	psychologists	successfully	identify	specific	human	cognitive	limitations”.			
3.	Descriptive	issues	in	bounded	rationality	theories		The	five	contributions	in	this	special	issue	give	a	clear	sense	that	at	the	moment	there	exists	a	plurality	of	approaches	to	BR	that	diverge	not	only	from	a	theoretical	viewpoint	but	also	at	the	methodological	level.	This	is	why	we	prefer	to	talk	of	“methodologies	of	bounded	rationality”,	rather	than	of	a	single	methodology.	The	main	differences	between	the	various	BR	methodologies	that	we	single	out	as	emerging	from	the	five	papers	concern:	(i)	the	kind	of	evidence	deemed	relevant	in	the	assessment	of	the	descriptive	accuracy	of	BR	models,	(ii)	the	modelling	desiderata	that	a	BR	model	should	
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display,	and	(iii)	the	normative	validity	of	BR	models,	that	is,	the	acceptability	of	its	“ought”	statements.	In	this	section	we	examine	the	first	two	differences,	related	to	the	descriptive	validity	of	the	models,	while	in	the	next	section	we	focus	on	issues	of	normative	validity.		
3.1.	Criteria	of	evidential	relevance			A	theme	that	resurfaces	across	many	of	the	articles	in	this	special	issue	concerns	the	relevance,	or	lack	thereof,	of	certain	kinds	of	evidence	in	adjudicating	between	competing	decision	models.		
Choice	vs.	non-choice	data.	According	to	an	important	tradition	within	mainstream	economics,	usually	associated	with	Paul	Samuelson	(1938)	and	whose	latest	vocal	exponents	are	Faruk	Gul	and	Wolfgang	Pesendorfer	(2008),	the	economic	theory	of	individual	decision-making	is	not	concerned	with	psychological	mechanisms	but	with	individuals’	observable	choices.	This	behaviourist	view	of	decision	analysis	is	by	no	means	shared	by	all	mainstream	economists	and	has	been	criticized	by	a	number	of	economic	methodologists,	beginning	with	Lionel	Robbins	(1935).5	The	issue	of	whether	only	choice	data	should	be	relevant	for	the	confirmation	of	economic	models	concerns	not	only	mainstream	models	but	also	BR	ones,	and,	as	we	have	seen,	there	is	an	array	of	different	methodological	stances	on	this	point.	Some	BR	theorists,	such	as	Bernheim	and	Rangel	(2009)	maintain	that	only	choice	data	are	relevant	for	decision	analysis.	Others	occupy	less	radical	positions.	For	example,	Manzini	and	Mariotti	(this	issue)	argue	that	choice	data	have	a	priority	over	other	types	of	data,	and	that	BR	models	should	be	characterized	in	terms	of	revealed	preference	axioms.	However,	they	also	make	room	for	non-choice	data,	such	as	neurophysiological	data	or	survey	responses,	in	order	to	understand	the	psychological	processes	behind	choices	and	model	them	appropriately.	In	particular,	non-choice	data	play	a	role	in	addressing	two	problems	associated	with	the	HRP	program.	First,	when	two	or	more	BR	models	of	decision-making	are	undistinguishable	in	terms	of	choice	data,	non-choice	data	can	play	an	important	role	in	discriminating	between	them.	Second,	when	only	one	BR	decision	model	is	compatible	with	choice	data	but	its	primitives	have	multiple	interpretations,	non-choice	data	may	help	in	selecting	the	most	plausible	interpretation	of	the	primitives.	In	the	FFH	program,	choice	data	do	not	seem	to	have	any	special	status	vis-à-vis	other	types	of	data.	Data	from	psychological	introspection,	physiological	or	neurophysiological	research,	interviews	and	responses	to	surveys	seem	to	be	as	important	as	choice	data	to	assess	whether	a	given	BR	model	is	descriptively	accurate.	The	divide	between	choice	and	non-choice	data	is	also	relevant	to	Ross’	claim	(this	issue)	that	mainstream	economists	are	epistemologically	justified	in	sticking	to	RCT.	His	
                                               5	One	of	the	main	reasons	why	the	behaviourist	view	appears	inadequate	to	capture	what	mainstream	economists	in	fact	do	is	that	fundamental	parts	of	decision	analysis	rely	on	psychological	elements	that	can	hardly	be	inferred	from	choice	data.	The	single	most	important	example	is	game	theory,	which	refers	to	unobservable	variables	such	as	interactive	beliefs	or	out-of-equilibrium	strategies.	For	a	methodological	discussion	of	the	behaviorist	view	of	decision	analysis	in	its	Gul-Pesendorfer	version,	see	Hausman	(2008),	Caplin	(2008),	Spiegler	(2008),	and	Moscati	(2010).	In	historical	perspective,	Moscati	(2013)	shows	that	the	conventional	portrait	of	Samuelson	as	the	early	champion	of	the	behaviorist	decision	analysis	is	misleading.	
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methodological	position	–	which	he	labels	“Neo-Samuelsonian”	–	is	a	variation	of	the	behaviourist	view	of	decision	analysis	described	above.	Ross	(2014	and	this	issue)	agrees	with	Gul	and	Pesendorfer	that	economics	is	about	observable	choices	but	disagrees	with	them	in	so	far	as	for	him	the	domain	of	economic	theory	is	not	individual	decision-making	but	aggregate	market	phenomena.	In	Ross’s	perspective,	it	is	only	aggregate	choice	data	that	count,	and	therefore	there	is	not	much	to	gain	in	testing	economic	models	against	psychological	data,	let	alone	neurophysiological	ones.	
Experimental	vs.	non-experimental	evidence.	Ken	Binmore	(1999)	has	famously	claimed	that	laboratory	evidence	of	failures	of	rationality	cannot	falsify	game	theory	models	when	the	tasks	and	environments	in	which	individuals	are	placed	are	too	artificial,	leave	no	room	for	learning,	and	incentives	are	too	low.	Similarly,	Gigerenzer	and	colleagues	sometimes	complain	that	many	of	the	behavioural	laboratory	experiments	the	H&B	program	uses	cannot	unambiguously	test	theories	of	bounded	rationality.	They	claim	that	if	the	heuristics	people	use	are	adapted	to	natural	environments,	then,	unless	the	laboratory	succeeds	in	capturing	the	features	of	such	environments,	it	cannot	tell	us	much	about	the	heuristics	people	actually	use	(e.g.	Gigerenzer	1991;	see	Kahneman	and	Tversky’s	response	1996).	In	contrast,	Manzini,	Mariotti	and	other	contributors	to	the	HRP	program	focus	almost	exclusively	on	experimental	data	and	regard	non-experimental	evidence	as	problematic	because,	they	claim,	it	lacks	the	kind	of	control	needed	for	theory	testing	(see	e.g.	Manzini,	Mariotti,	and	Mittone	2010).		
Within	sample-fit	vs.	out-of-sample	prediction.	Berg	and	Gigerenzer	(2010)	contend	that	H&B	models	fair	well	in	terms	of	within-sample	fit,	but	are	in	no	way	superior	to	other	approaches	(including	RCT)	when	it	comes	to	out-of-sample	predictions.	According	to	Berg	and	Gigerenzer	(2010),	however,	out-of-sample	prediction	is	a	more	severe	test	for	a	decision	model	(see	also	Berg,	this	issue;	Katsikopolous,	this	issue).	In	particular,	the	exponents	of	the	FFH	program	typically	claim	that	their	models	are	superior	to	RCT	and	other	BR	models	with	regards	to	out-of-sample	predictions.		
Technological	success.	By	technological	success	we	mean	the	implementation	of	a	theory	or	model	into	a	successful	intervention,	viz.	an	intervention	that	brings	about	the	desired	result.	Technological	success	speaks	in	favour	of	a	theory	or	model	in	that	a	necessary	(though	not	sufficient)	condition	for	the	success	of	an	intervention	is	that	the	theory	gets	the	causal	relationship	on	which	the	intervention	is	based	right	(see	e.g.	Cartwright	2009).	The	use	of	insights	from	the	H&B	program	for	the	design	of	apparently	successful	policy	interventions	such	as	those	introduced	by	the	Nudge	Unit	of	the	British	Government6	can	be	regarded	as	testifying	in	favour	of	the	program’s	empirical	performance.		Fast-and-frugal	heuristics	have	been	less	popular	among	policy	makers	than	nudge-heuristics.	However,	the	observation	that	decision	tools	based	on	fast	and	frugal	heuristics	lead	to	better	performance	in	terms	of	wellbeing	(see	Berg,	this	issue)	has	been	taken	as	speaking	in	favour	of	FFH	models.	However,	it	is	unclear	whether	successful	interventions	do	speak	in	favour	of	one	or	another	approach	in	any	general	sense	because	the	connection	between	theory	and	policy	is	often	tenuous	at	best.			
3.2.	Modelling	desiderata	
                                               6	See	www.gov.uk/government/organisations/behavioural-insights-team.	
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	Proponents	of	different	BR	models	place	emphasis	on	different	modelling	desiderata.	From	the	articles	in	this	special	issue	we	identify	three	such	desiderata:	mechanistic	detail,	generality	and	parsimony.	Whether	or	not	these	desiderata,	as	they	are	conceived	by	BR	scholars,	justifiably	count	as	virtues,	and	what	kind	of	virtues	they	are,	is	not	an	issue	we	will	deal	with	here.	However,	we	are	inclined	towards	a	pluralist	stance	according	to	which	models	can	have	several	desiderata,	some	of	which	may	trade	off.	This	view	implies	that	no	single	model	is	likely	to	display	all	desiderata	at	once	(see	e.g.	Levins	1966,	Matthewson	and	Weisberg	2009,	Gabaix	and	Laibson	2008).	
Mechanistic	detail.	The	inclusion	of	mechanistic	details	is	a	desideratum	to	which	all	three	programs	appear	to	be	committed.	This	is	perhaps	not	surprising	considering	that	building	more	psychologically	realistic	models	than	those	of	RCT	has	been	one	of	the	main	motivations	behind	theories	of	bounded	rationality.	Even	so,	however,	there	seem	to	be	different	interpretations	of	what	including	mechanistic	details	into	a	model	of	decision-making	entails.	For	example,	Katsikopolous’	notion	of	process	model	can	be	read	as	an	appeal	to	the	idea	that	the	more	details	about	underlying	psychological	processes	models	include,	the	better	are	the	models	(Katsikopoulos	this	issue,	see	also	Berg	and	Gigerenzer	2010).	Katsikopolous	claims	that	models	of	the	idealistic	culture,	including	many	in	the	H&B	program,	do	not	represent	such	processes.	Manzini	and	Mariotti’s	model	is	a	special	case.	They	explicitly	claim	that	their	models	seek	to	represent	“the	decision	process	that	underlies	choice”	(Manzini	and	Mariotti,	this	issue).	However,	it	appears	that	they	do	not	give	direct	evidence	for	this	process,	and	therefore	we	suspect	that	FFH	representatives	would	not	consider	theirs	a	“process	model”.	
Generality.	An	often-mentioned	advantage	of	RCT	over	BR	models	is	that	the	former	applies	to	all	decision	situations,	while	the	latter	identifies	a	whole	range	of	different	decision	rules	tailor-made	to	cater	for	particular	contexts	but	which	are	not	always	generalizable	to	other	sets	of	circumstances.	As	we	have	seen,	Ross	(this	issue)	puts	forward	a	version	of	this	argument:	since	BR	decision	rules	depend	on	the	institutional	and	informational	properties	of	markets,	a	general	model	of	BR	cannot	be	had	and	this	justifies	economists’	use	of	RCT.	In	the	FFH	program,	however,	generality	does	not	appear	so	fundamental	as	a	modelling	desideratum.	As	stressed	for	example	by	Berg	(this	issue),	FFH	models	are	intrinsically	local,	in	the	sense	that	they	state	that	in	decision	situations	of	a	certain	kind,	a	certain	type	of	decision	rule	is	adopted.	It	must	be	noted,	however,	that	Gigerenzer	and	associates	often	appeal	to	generality	to	criticize	H&B	models:	they	argue	that	the	latter	kind	of	models	are	tailored	to	fit	data	obtained	in	artificial	laboratory	situations	and	cannot	be	generalized	to	actual	environments	outside	the	laboratory.	Generality	as	a	modelling	desideratum	appears	to	be	more	important	within	the	HRP	program.	An	important	part	of	this	program,	in	fact,	is	to	check	whether	decision	rules	that	capture	very	different	BR	psychological	processes	can	be	characterized	in	terms	of	the	same	revealed	preference	axioms.	For	instance,	Manzini	and	Mariotti	show	that	both	their	Categorize-Then-Choose	heuristic	and	a	different	heuristic	called	Rationalization	(Cherepanov,	Feddersen	and	Sandroni	2013)	generate	choices	that	satisfy	the	Weak	WARP.7	
                                               7	As	we	have	seen,	in	Categorize	Then	Choose	the	agent	first	simplifies	his	choice	task	by	categorizing	the	alternatives	and	focusing	on	one	single	class,	and	then	chooses	the	most	preferred	alternative	from	that	class.	In	Rationalization,	the	agent	first	selects	the	alternatives	
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Parsimony.	Manzini	and	Mariotti	(this	issue)	suggest	that	parsimony	is	a	criterion	for	discriminating	between	observationally	equivalent	BR	models.	The	principle	of	parsimony	has	a	venerable	history	in	science.	In	its	formulation	as	Ockham’s	razor,	it	recommends	ontological	parsimony.	As	a	criterion	of	theory	choice	and	synonym	of	simplicity,	it	states	that	among	competing	theories	the	one	employing	the	fewer	assumptions	should	be	chosen,	ceteris	paribus.	Parsimony	is	often	taken	as	a	sign	of	truth,	but	why	it	is	so	remains	a	matter	of	philosophical	debate.	Alternatively,	it	is	interpreted	as	a	sign	of	predictive	accuracy.	To	illustrate	the	idea	behind	parsimony	as	a	criterion	of	selection,	Manzini	and	Mariotti	(this	issue)	take	Selten	(1991)’s	measure	of	predictive	success	as	an	example.	This	measure	ranks	models	according	to	their	descriptive	power	or	‘hit	rate’	(i.e.	the	proportion	of	observed	outcomes	consistent	with	the	model)	minus	their	‘relative	area’	(i.e.	the	proportion	of	theoretically	possible	outcomes	that	are	consistent	with	the	model).	The	adoption	of	Selten’s	measure	suggests	that	Manzini	and	Mariotti	interpret	parsimony	as	a	measure	of	predictive	accuracy	of	a	model	rather	than	of	its	truth.	So	interpreted,	Manzini	and	Mariotti’s	position	comes	close	to	Gigerenzer	and	colleagues’	complaint	about	the	fact	that	H&B	models	have	multiple	free	parameters	(see	Katsikopoulos,	this	issue).	The	idea	is	that	the	presence	of	many	free	parameters	runs	the	risk	of	overfitting	one’s	model	in	terms	of	a	particular	dataset	and	hence	to	make	it	a	poor	predictive	tool.	As	Forster	and	Sober	(1994)	point	out,	parsimony	can	mitigate	the	risk	of	overfitting	(for	discussion	in	the	context	of	BR	models,	see	e.g.	Gigerenzer	and	Brighton	2009).			
4.	Normative	issues	in	bounded	rationality	theories			Bounded	rationality,	although	bounded,	is	still	a	kind	of	rationality.	Consequently,	it	still	makes	normative	claims	–	how	one	ought	to	reason,	what	one	ought	to	do	–	only	within	its	bounds.	Some	of	the	contributors	to	this	issue,	for	example	Hands	and	Berg,	explicitly	endorse	this	position,	while	others,	for	example	Ross,	strenuously	seek	to	avoid	addressing	any	normative	implications	altogether.	We	leave	it	open	whether	the	concept	of	BR	necessarily	has	normative	implications.	Instead,	we	discuss	in	this	section	only	those	models	that	make	normative	claims.	The	question	that	arise	for	these	models	include	the	following:			 (i) What	are	the	normative	claims	of	bounded	rationality?	(ii) Is	bounded	rationality	normatively	less	valid	than	unbounded	rationality?	(iii) How	is	the	normative	validity	of	bounded	rationality	justified?		In	this	section,	we	survey	some	possible	answers	to	these	three	questions,	found	in	the	literature	on	rational	decision-making.	Not	all	of	them	were	intended	for	models	of	bounded	rationality,	but	rather	for	models	of	expected	utility	maximization.	Yet,	as	we	will	argue,	these	answers	can	be	applied,	mutatis	mutandis,	to	BR	as	well.	So	here	go	our	three	questions.	
                                               that	he	can	justify	on	the	basis	of	some	rationale	(e.g.	alternatives	that	are	“morally	acceptable”),	and	then	chooses	the	most	preferred	alternative	from	the	rationalized	ones.	From	a	psychological	viewpoint,	the	first	stages	of	Categorize	Then	Choose	and	Rationalization	are	significantly	different.	
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	(i)	What	are	the	normative	claims	of	bounded	rationality?	The	normative	claims	of	the	various	models	of	rationality	(including	BR)	differ	both	in	their	target	and	their	content.	Regarding	the	differences	in	targets,	some	models	impose	normative	constraints	on	mental	states	and	reasoning	rules	or	on	revealed	preferences.	We	call	these	internal	consistency	accounts	of	rationality.	Manzini	and	Mariotti	(this	issue)	defend	such	an	internal	consistency	account	of	BR,	as	when	they	recommend	their	theory	as	being	able	to	deal	with	“very	mild	forms	of	inconsistency”,	while	still	satisfying	sufficiently	weakened	internal	consistency	requirements.	In	contrast	to	these,	other	models	impose	normative	constraints	on	actions,	often	conditional	on	particular	environments,	derived	from	various	considerations	of	pragmatic	success.	We	call	these	
external	performance	accounts	of	rationality	(see	Berg,	this	issue).	These	two	types	of	accounts	are	further	differentiated	by	what	constraints	they	impose.	Internal	consistency	accounts	impose	for	example	consistency	criteria	like	the	law	of	excluded	middle	(already	proposed	by	Aristotle),	preference	transitivity	(von	Neumann	and	Morgenstern	1944)	or	the	Kolomogrov	probability	axioms	(Kolmogorov	1933).	External	performance	accounts	for	example	impose	performance	criteria	such	as	robustly	meeting	a	minimal	payoff	threshold	(Simon	1955),	frugality	of	the	decision	rule	(Gigerenzer	and	Todd	1999),	or	sufficient	approximation	to	the	environment’s	cue	structure	(Martignon	and	Hoffrage	1999).			(ii)	Is	bounded	rationality	normatively	less	valid	than	unbounded	rationality?	By	normative	validity	we	mean	the	validity	of	the	“ought”	statements	of	the	model,	in	contrast	to	descriptive	validity,	which	refers	to	the	model’s	“is”	statements.	The	concept	of	bounded	rationality	is	typically	contrasted	with	a	notion	of	unbounded	rationality.	This	is	not	a	conceptual	necessity:	perhaps	the	concept	of	rationality	only	makes	sense	under	some	kinds	of	constraints	(Bayesian	rationality	under	uncertainty,	for	example,	assumes	constraints	on	information;	instrumental	rationality,	broadly	understood,	assumes	scarcity	of	resources).	Yet	de	facto,	all	BR	models	have	been	proposed	against	the	foil	of	some	model	of	rationality	that	is	not	similarly	bounded	(the	paradigmatic	example	of	this	kind	of	model	being	the	rational-choice	one).	The	contrastive	presentation	does	not	imply	that	the	BR	model	is	necessarily	less	normatively	valid	than	the	unbounded	model,	however.		Based	on	the	above	dual	distinction	between	internal	and	external	criteria	for	both	bounded	and	unbounded	rationality,	we	distinguish	three	cases	(Table	1).	If	both	unbounded	and	BR	models	are	based	on	internal	consistency	(case	A),	then	additional	constraints	of	the	BR	model	(for	example,	computational	limitations)	necessarily	reduce	the	stringency	of	the	criteria	of	bounded	rationality.	Consequently,	the	criteria	of	the	BR	model	are	easier	to	satisfy	than	that	of	the	unbounded	model.	For	example,	Manzini	and	Mariotti’s	Weak	WARP	is	less	stringent	than	WARP.	Now,	in	terms	of	validity,	there	are	two	scenarios.	If	the	internal	consistency	criteria	of	unbounded	rationality	are	valid,	then	the	BR	model	is	normatively	less	valid	than	the	unbounded	model	in	that	it	satisfies	fewer	such	criteria	(case	A1).	If	however	some	of	the	internal	consistency	criteria	of	unbounded	rationality	are	not	valid,	then	the	BR	model,	by	relaxing	those	criteria,	might	be	more	valid	than	the	unbounded	model	(case	A2).	If	the	unbounded	rationality	model	is	based	exclusively	on	internal	consistency	criteria,	but	the	BR	model	is	not	(case	B),	then	the	BR	model,	although	it	reduces	the	
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stringency	of	internal	criteria,	might	satisfy	external	criteria	better	than	the	unbounded	model.	In	this	case,	the	BR	model	might	be	normatively	more	valid	than	the	unbounded	model.	For	example,	the	FFH	normative	model	is	based	on	external	criteria,	and	it	may	well	be	that	on	such	criteria	it	fares	better	than	the	unbounded	model	even	though	the	internal	criteria	of	the	FHH	model	are	less	stringent.	This	is	precisely	the	kind	of	claim	Berg	makes	in	his	contribution	to	this	issue.		 [table	1	here]		In	sum,	there	is	one	case	(A1)	in	which	the	unbounded	model	is	normatively	more	valid	than	the	BR	model	of	rationality,	given	that	both	models	are	based	on	the	same	kind	of	validity	criteria	and	all	the	criteria	by	which	the	unbounded	model	is	characterized	are	indeed	valid.	Conversely,	there	are	two	kinds	of	cases	(cases	A2,	&	B)	in	which	the	BR	model	might	be	more	valid	than	the	unbounded	model:	either	when	the	two	models	are	based	on	different	kinds	of	criteria,	or	when	they	are	based	on	the	same	kind	of	validity	criteria,	but	the	criteria	by	which	the	unbounded	model	is	characterized	are	not	valid.		(iii)	How	is	the	validity	of	bounded	rationality	justified?	So	far,	we	characterized	the	nature	of	normative	validity	criteria	and	the	consequences	for	both	models	of	bounded	and	unbounded	rationality.	In	this	section	we	instead	turn	to	the	methods	by	which	criteria	of	normative	validity	are	sought	to	be	justified	(see	Hands,	this	issue).8	We	distinguish	five	methods	of	validation	found	in	the	literature:		a. derived	from	conceptual	analysis;	b. derived	from	universal	loss-avoidance	considerations;	c. based	on	unambiguously	normatively	exemplary	empirical	cases;	d. derived	from	narrow	(d1)	and	wide	(d2)	reflective	equilibrium	between	intuitive	judgments	and	purported	principles;	e. inferential	coherence	meta-criteria.		We	briefly	describe	each	of	these	methods	in	turn.	Note	that	we	do	not	endorse	any	particular	method	of	validation.	The	point	is	to	map	the	conceptual	terrain	in	which	to	place	various	arguments	about	the	superior	validity	of	competing	models	of	rationality.		
a. Normative	validation	criteria	derived	from	conceptual	analysis	This	argument	for	the	normative	appropriateness	of	certain	internal	consistency	criteria	suggests	that	these	criteria	are	constitutive	of	the	meaning	of	preference,	belief	or	intention.	Take	for	example	preference	transitivity.	Drawing	an	analogy	to	length	measurement,	Davidson	(1976,	273)	asks:			 If	length	is	not	transitive,	what	does	it	mean	to	use	a	number	to	measure	length	at	all?	We	could	find	or	invent	an	answer,	but	unless	or	until	we	do,	we	must	strive	to	interpret	‘longer	than’	so	that	it	comes	out	transitive.	Similarly	for	‘preferred	to’.		
                                               8	Hands	(this	issue)	employs	naturalistic	criteria	of	justification.	Our	criteria	partially	coincide	with	his.	We	will	clarify	the	connection	later	on	in	this	section.	
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	Violating	transitivity,	Davidson	claims,	thus	undermines	the	very	meaning	of	preferring	one	option	over	others.	Consequently,	to	the	extent	that	one	prefers	anything	at	all	to	something	else,	one	must	satisfy	the	transitivity	criterion.	In	a	similar	vein,	Robbins	had	earlier	argued	that	minimal	criteria	of	preference	ordering	are	logical	prerequisites	for	economic	action.	“The	main	postulate	of	the	theory	of	value	–	Robbins	(1935,	78-9)	wrote	–	is	the	fact	that	individuals	can	arrange	their	preferences	in	an	order,	and	in	fact	do	so.”	This	fundamental	postulate	is	“an	essential	constituent	of	our	conception	of	conduct	with	an	economic	aspect.”	(75).	According	to	Robbins,	“[w]e	do	not	need	controlled	experiments	to	establish	their	validity:	they	are	so	much	stuff	of	our	everyday	experience	that	they	only	have	to	be	stated	to	be	recognised	as	obvious.”	(79)	Hence,	such	fundamental	postulates	do	not	need	any	further	justification.		In	sum,	according	to	this	method,	one’s	representational	tools	must	satisfy	certain	criteria	(e.g.	Davidson’s	transitivity	criterion,	or	Robbins’	preference	ordering)	if	one	aims	to	represent	economic	behaviour	at	all.			
b. Normative	validation	criteria	derived	from	universal	loss-avoidance	considerations		A	different	argument	for	the	validity	of	consistency	criteria	is	derived	from	considerations	of	the	negative	consequences	incurred	when	these	criteria	are	violated.	Such	considerations	show	that	violating	consistency	of	beliefs	or	preferences	can	lead	to	situations	where	the	violator	incurs	a	sure	loss.	The	most	famous	argument	of	this	kind	is	the	so-called	“Dutch	Book”	argument.	The	basic	idea	was	developed	by	Frank	Ramsey	(1928,	182),	who	pointed	out	that	if	a	subject's	behaviour	violates	the	axioms	of	probability,	then	“[h]e	could	have	a	book	made	against	him	by	a	cunning	better	and	would	then	stand	to	lose	in	any	event.”9	If	an	agent	violates	the	transitivity	condition	on	preferences,	then	that	individual	can	be	“money	pumped”:	all	wealth	can	be	taken	from	her,	simply	by	trading	goods	with	her	in	a	way	that	exploits	her	preference	intransitivity	(for	discussion	of	these	arguments,	see	Berg,	this	issue	and	Hands,	this	issue).	Consequently,	to	the	extent	that	any	one	wants	to	avoid	such	sure	losses,	one	must	satisfy	the	corresponding	internal	consistency	criteria.			
c. Normative	validation	criteria	based	on	unambiguously	normatively	exemplary	cases		A	very	different	argument	for	normative	validity	claims	that	rationality	models	should	capture	the	reasoning	and	decision-making	of	those	who	are	most	competent	and	successful	in	the	relevant	domain.	In	the	history	of	decision	theory,	such	arguments	have	been	employed	–	with	rather	different	purposes	–	by	Daniel	Bernoulli,	Condorcet	and	Maurice	Allais.	Each	of	these	authors	argued	for	or	against	the	normative	validity	of	expected	utility	theory	(EUT)	by	showing	“that	it	captures	[or	does	not	capture]	the	decision	rule	actually	applied	by	those	considered	wisest	in	making	choices	under	uncertainty”	(Jallais,	Pradier	and	Teira	2008).	Specifically,	Bernoulli	cited	the	reasoning	and	decision-making	of	businessmen,	gamblers	and	insurers	to	support	his	claim	that	EUT	was	the	normatively	most	valid	theory	of	decision-making	under	uncertainty.	In	contrast,	Condorcet	cited	the	reasoning	and	decision-making	of	the	same	kind	of	experts	
                                               9	The	argument	was	independently	developed	in	more	detail	by	de	Finetti	(1931).	For	decisions	under	certainty,	a	similar	argument	has	been	developed	by	Davidson,	McKinsey	and	Suppes	(1955).	
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to	show	that	EUT	was	not	normatively	valid.	Allais	follows	Condorcet	in	citing	such	empirical	evidence	against	EUT,	but	for	him,	the	relevant	experts	come	from	a	different	domain:	namely,	scientists	in	high	standing	who	are	well-versed	in	probability	theory	(Jallais,	Pradier	and	Teira	2008).	Consequently,	for	any	model	of	rationality	–	whether	bounded	or	unbounded	–	to	be	normatively	valid,	it	needs	to	be	shown	that	it	represents	the	most	competent	and	successful	decision-making	in	the	relevant	domain.		External	performance	accounts	of	BR	(cf.	Berg,	this	issue)	need	to	address	the	following	question	about	normatively	exemplary	cases:	Is	the	average	or	cumulative	payoffs	we	observe	really	generated	by	the	application	of	certain	heuristics,	or	is	it	a	matter	of	chance	or	other	factors?	One	can	answer	this	question	only	by	explaining	why	the	observed	behaviour	should	be	considered	normatively	exemplary,	and	the	employed	measure	not	merely	accidentally	inflated.	Hand’s	criticism	(this	issue)	sets	in	exactly	here.	He	argues	that	there	is	little	evidence	showing	that	relevant	actors	either	actually	or	hypothetically	adopt	fast-and-frugal	heuristics	over	RCT	rules,	and	therefore	he	concludes	that	the	normative	validity	of	the	FFH	program	over	RCT	has	not	been	established	on	these	grounds.		
d1.	Normative	validation	criteria	derived	from	narrow	reflective	equilibrium	The	above	accounts	of	a	method	of	normative	justification	rely	on	the	existence	of	such	reference	points	as	conceptual	analysis,	pragmatic	consequences	or	exemplary	cases.	It	is	not	obvious	that	any	of	these	methods	is	available	or	sufficiently	reliable	to	base	the	normative	justification	of	a	particular	model	of	rationality.	By	contrast,	reflective	equilibrium	approaches	take	two	(or	more)	reference	points	into	account,	allowing	for	the	fallibility	of	either	reference	point	or	of	both.	The	assumption	is	that	despite	their	fallibility,	these	reference	points,	when	allowed	to	correct	each	other,	will	contribute	to	an	overall	coherent	account	of	normatively	valid	rationality	criteria.	We	distinguish	a	
narrow	and	a	wide	notion	of	reflective	equilibrium,	depending	on	the	number	and	kind	of	reference	points	taken	into	account.	On	the	narrow	notion	of	reflective	equilibrium,	(i)	intuitively	plausible	normative	criteria	are	exposed	to	(ii)	actually	observed,	common	inferential	and	decision-making	practices.	Typical	proponents	of	such	a	narrow	notion	are	Jacob	Marschak		(1951),	Leonard	J.	Savage	(1954)	and	L.	Jonathan	Cohen	(1981).	Savage,	in	response	to	Allais’s	empirical	result	that	the	majority	of	experimental	subjects	violated	the	sure-thing	principle	(an	internal	consistency	requirement	on	preferences	over	lotteries),	argued	that:			 If,	after	thorough	deliberation,	anyone	maintains	a	pair	of	distinct	preferences	that	are	in	conflict	with	the	sure-thing	principle,	he	must	abandon,	or	modify,	the	principle;	for	that	kind	of	discrepancy	seems	intolerable	in	a	normative	theory.	(Savage	1954:	102)		Savage	recognized	that	the	consistency	requirements	of	EUT	were	in	principle	revisable	in	the	light	of	counterexamples.	Then,	he	identified	normativity	with	the	convincing	
power	of	a	theory,	and	proposed	his	test.	Notably,	Savage’s	method	was	not	founded	on	any	formal	(however	minimal)	definition	of	rationality	(see	Guala	2000,	72).	This	account	of	reflective	equilibrium	is	narrow,	because	it	only	aims	to	bring	to	equilibrium	intuitive	normative	principles	on	the	one	hand,	and	empirical	
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counterexamples	on	the	other.	In	this	way,	Cohen	(1981)	claims,	the	procedure	is	similar	to	devising	a	grammar	that	fits	a	population's	linguistic	practice:	it	commences	from	principles	that	are	considered	normatively	valid	(“how	one	should	speak”)	but	these	principles	are	revised	in	the	light	of	certain	counterexamples	of	how	people	really	
do	speak.		
d2.	Normative	validation	criteria	derived	from	wide	reflective	equilibrium		Wide	reflective	equilibrium,	in	addition	to	the	normative	principles	and	relevant	examples	of	actual	reasoning	and	choice	practices,	also	takes	into	account	a	number	of	background	information	and	theories,	specifically	about	cognitive	capacities	and	limitations,	goals	of	inferential	behaviour,	and	philosophical	theories.	One	important	motivation	for	this	inclusion	is	the	aspiration	to	provide	something	more	than	merely	a	grammar	of	reasoning:	the	wide	equilibrium	should	yield	inferential	principles	that	are	
optimal	given	goals	and	philosophical	theories,	but	nevertheless	feasible	within	the	given	limitations	(Thagard	1982,	35).	Simply	matching	normative	principles	and	counterexamples	does	not	suffice	for	this	aspiration.		Such	a	theory	of	wide	equilibrium	has	been	proposed	mainly	in	ethics	(see	Rawls	1971,	Daniels	1979),	but	some	people	(e.g.	Goldman	1978)	have	argued	that	considerations	of	this	sort	are	relevant	also	in	epistemology	and	logic.	Amongst	the	contributors	to	this	special	issue,	Manzini	and	Mariotti	as	well	as	Hands	pursue	such	a	wide	equilibrium.	Manzini	and	Mariotti	(this	issue,	our	emphasis)	insist	that	“the	reason	
for	individual	choice	is	important	to	us,	besides	choice	itself	[...]	we	seek	to	understand	the	mechanism	generating	individual	choice.”	They	thus	seek	to	incorporate	into	their	model	not	only	normative	principles	like	weak	WARP	and	counterexamples	of	choice	violating	SARP,	but	also	reasons	and	purposes	pursued	with	the	choice.	Hands	(this	issue)	cautiously	concedes	that	considerations	of	“ought	implies	can”	might	give	FFH	models	an	advantage	in	normative	validity	over	RCT	models.		However,	the	problem	with	wide	reflective	equilibrium	is	the	possibility	of	multiple	equilibria.	Depending	on	their	own	sense	of	diligence	and	exactitude,	some	people	might	be	too	readily	willing	to	settle	on	principles	that	are	clearly	fallible.	This	raises	the	question,	whose	equilibrium	should	count?	There	are	two	possible	answers,	a	populist	and	an	elitist	one.	The	populist	strategy,	favoured	by	Cohen	(1981),	is	to	emphasize	the	reflective	equilibrium	of	the	average	person.	This	strategy	founders,	because	education	in	sophisticated	inferential	techniques	can	be	expected	to	provide	the	individual	with	a	much	more	efficacious	system.	The	elitist	strategy,	favoured	by	Stich	and	Nisbett	(1980),	is	to	emphasize	the	reflective	equilibrium	of	experts.	This	too	is	inadequate,	for	it	leaves	us	no	way	of	saying	why	the	experts	should	be	in	equilibrium,	or	of	mediating	disputes	among	experts	(see	Thagard	1982).	Both	narrow	and	wide	equilibrium	give	a	considerable	role	to	intuitive	judgments.	However,	in	contrast	to	the	conceptual	analysis	approach	of	method	(a),	narrow	and	wide	equilibrium	adopt	an	explicitly	fallibilist	position	towards	normative	intuitions:	informal	notions	of	rationality	play	a	regulative	role	in	assessing	formal	rationality	criteria,	but	they	are	corrigible	in	the	light	of	some	counterexamples.	In	contrast	to	the	exemplary	cases	approach	(c),	formal	rationality	criteria	are	not	exclusively	built	on	empirical	case	studies.	The	intuitive	notions	retain	a	guiding	and	regulating	role,	while	the	counterexamples	are	useful	for	theory-improvement,	but	not	every	example	is	allowed	to	falsify	a	theory	(see	Guala	2000,	70-71).	
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e. Normative	validation	criteria	derived	from	inferential	coherence	meta-criteria	Thagard	(1982)	explicitly	criticizes	the	exemplary	cases	approach	(c)	and	the	equilibrium	approaches	(d1)	and	(d2)	as	inadequate	methods	to	get	from	the	psychology	of	reasoning	and	decision-making	to	normatively	valid	principles	of	deductive,	inductive	and	practical	reasoning.	Instead	of	relying	on	finding	some	equilibrium	between	the	various	reference	points	as	in	(d1)	and	(d2),	he	suggests	that	the	process	of	arriving	at	normatively	valid	criteria	of	reasoning	and	decision	making	should	be	governed	by	a	number	of	inferential	meta-criteria.	Specifically,	he	proposes	three	such	criteria:		 (1)	Robustness:	to	what	extent	do	the	normative	principles	account	for	inductive	practice?	(2)	Accommodation:	to	what	extent	do	background	theories	account	for	deviations	of	inductive	practice	from	the	normative	principles?	(3)	Efficacy:	given	background	theories,	to	what	extent	does	following	the	normative	principles	promote	the	satisfaction	of	the	inferential	goals?		The	third	meta-criterion,	in	particular,	distinguishes	Thagard’s	account	from	internalist	coherence	accounts	such	as	those	derived	from	conceptual	analysis	(a)	and	from	loss-avoidance	consideration	(b).	Furthermore,	this	account	differs	from	(d1)	and	(d2)	in	that	equilibrium	might	be	a	consequence	of	satisfying	these	meta-criteria,	but	it	need	not	be.	In	the	case	that	a	non-equilibrium	set	of	beliefs	better	satisfies	these	criteria	than	an	equilibrated	one,	the	former	should	be	chosen:			 Coherence	is	to	be	evaluated	according	to	criteria	to	which	the	achievement	of	reflective	equilibrium	is	irrelevant.	What	we	are	really	after	is	not	equilibrium,	but	progress:	the	development	of	better	and	better	inferential	systems.	(Thagard	1982,	39-40)		This	of	course	raises	the	question	how	these	meta-principles	themselves	are	justified.	Thagard	answers	with	a	strong	naturalist	position	on	normativity:	“What	in	turn	justifies	these?	They	seem	to	be	the	ones	actually	used	when	we	set	out	to	evaluate	inferential	practices”	(Thagard	1982,	40).	It	is	noteworthy	that	none	of	the	authors	contributing	to	this	issue	seeks	to	justify	the	normative	validity	of	their	respective	models	with	such	a	set	of	meta-criteria	of	coherence.			
5.	Concluding	remarks	
	In	this	introduction	we	examined	some	of	the	questions	concerning	the	descriptive	accuracy	and	normative	validity	of	alternative	approaches	to	bounded	rationality,	which	we	thought	were	raised	by	the	articles	collected	in	this	special	issue.	In	particular,	we	focused	on	ideas	about	the	relevance	of	different	kinds	of	evidence,	preferences	for	different	modelling	desiderata,	and	alternative	methods	for	the	justification	of	the	normativity	of	theories	of	rationality.	We	deliberately	refrained	from	taking	a	stance	in	favour	of	one	or	the	other	conception,	preference	or	justificatory	method.	Our	hope	is	
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that	the	special	issue	as	a	whole	will	contribute	to	stimulate	further	reflections	on	these	important	issues	among	philosophers	of	economics	and	practitioners.		
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Account	of	BR		
Account	of		
full	rationality	
Internal	consistency	
criteria	
External	performance	
criteria	
Internal	consistency	criteria	 (A1)	BR	less	valid,	because	BR	subject	to	lesser	degree	of	internal	consistency	(A2)	BR	more	valid	if	more	stringent	criteria	are	not	themselves	valid	
(B)	BR	sometimes	more	valid,	when	BR	gives	better	performance	results	than	full	internal	consistency	
Table	1:	Internal	consistency	and	external	performance	criteria			
